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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS POLICY: ATTUNING IT
TO UNIONS WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS
Jay I. Levit*
N the National Labor Relations Act it is the stated policy of the
United States to encourage the collective bargaining process. This
article submits that in order to effectuate such a policy, a recognition
of the nature and basic need of the union in a procedure involving three
parties is vital.
I.'THE THREE-PARTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
*Generally, organized labor relations involve three interested parties-
employer, employee, and union.' Sometimes there is a tendency to draw
a line of demarcation between management and union, it being seem-
ingly but deceivingly implicit that the employees involved are included
in the concept of "union" since the union is their bargaining representa-
tive. One may also unwittingly limit his perspective of labor relations
by speaking in two-party terms such as "companies and unions," "labor-
management," or similar phrases.
Organized labor relations cannot be intelligently viewed from the
standpoint of company-union only, because individual employees,
whether members of the union or not, may well have basic interests
different from or even in conflict with legitimate interests that the union
has as a union. This is an everyday, working fact of industrial relations
life quite apparent to those company personnel men, industrial relations
departments, and union officers having "savvy." The distinction be-
tween employees as employees (whether they be union members or
not) and unions as unions is not one of mere theoretical significance,
but is a distinction having a practical importance dictated by the ex-
press, stated labor relations policy of the United States Government.
Congress' statement of the policy of the United States, the exegesis
* Member of the Virginia Bar. A.B., Western Reserve, 1955; LL.B., Richmond, 1958;
LL.M., Harvard, 1959.
' See, e.g., Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423 (1969). The Court recognizes that
there are ". . . three participants in the labor-management relation: employer, em-
ployee, and union." Id. at 431.
[92]
LABOR
of which is the purpose of this article, first appeared in the original
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), - and is still the
stated policy of this country. The vital and final portion of this state-
ment of policy declares:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to elimi-
nate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow.of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and con-
ditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.3
Employees may, of course, attempt to bargain collectively with their
employer in a variety of ways, e.g., by designating a fellow employee
as their spokesman or perhaps by designating. a committee of fellow
employees to meet with management. However, workers usually bargain
on a collective basis with their employer by choosing a labor organiza-
tion, a "union," as their bargaining representative. Unions are what the
National Labor Relations Act 4 is all about. As a practical matter, with.
out a union there usually can be no effective collective bargaining to-
day. It follows, therefore, that United States policy encouraging the
collective bargaining process must, to be effective, be applied within
reasonable limits in recognition of the nature and basic need of any
union.
What is the nature and basic need of a union? The answer is quite
apparent and for this reason one may tend to overlook it. The nature of
a union is the same as that of any business in the competitive market-
place. The union's basic need is, of course, to survive as a union. Survival
is also the basic need of a business. If a company does not produce a
product that is competitive in the marketplace, it will fail. Employees
are the union's marketplace. If it does not attract and keep a sufficient
number of employees as members, it will fail as a union. If a union does
not obtain competitive wages, hours, and working conditions for the
employees it represents, it will ultimately fail. In short, unions are a
business. The line of demarcation between management and union is
2 National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-16, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. 5§ 151-68 (1964) [hereinafter cited as NLRAI.
S29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
4 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1964).
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really between two businesses, both competing in the marketplace.
*It is not contended in this article that organized labor is to be given
any preferred position by labor relations legislation. Indeed, although
the Wagner Act of 19355 originally specified only employer unfair labor
practices, the National Labor Relations Act of today, as amended by
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) 1
contains specified union unfair labor practices as well. Further, one cer-
tainly must take into account the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 7 which places broad
administrative controls (primarily through the Secretary of Labor) over
certain union activities and incorporates a "Bill of Rights" for individual
union members.
It is contended, however, that in the broad collective bargaining proc-
ess which the United States Government encourages, it is vital, in order
to effectively resolve conflicts inherent in the management-union-em-
ployee relationship, to recognize (1) that the union may have legitimate
interests separate and distinct from those of the individual employees,
whether they be union members or not, and (2) that certain manage-
ment-union-employee conflicts may have to be resolved in the union's
favor if the principle of collective bargaining is to be preserved. Three
illustrative areas will be considered to explore this argument.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE AREAS
A. Grievance-Arbitration Procedure
In Republic Steel Corporation v. Maddox,8 Maddox, a union member,
sued his employer, Republic, in a state court for severance pay which
he claimed was due him by virtue of his layoff and the collective bar-
gaining agreement entered into between Republic and his union. The
collective bargaining agreement called for severance pay if the layoff
was the result of a decision (which it was) to "permanently" close
the mine at which Maddox worked. Maddox did not first attempt to
utilize the grievance and arbitration procedure, set forth in the col-
lective bargaining contract, before bringing his lawsuit.
5 See NLRA, §9 1-16, ch. 372, 49 Star. 449-57 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §5 151-
68 (1964).
0Labor-Management Relations Act 9§ 1-503, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136-62 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §5 141-87 (1964).
7 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in 29 U.S.C. §5 401-531 (1964) and
other scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
- 379 U-S. 650 (1965).
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I The majority of the Court (Justice Black dissenting), speaking
through Justice Harlan, held that Maddox could not bring such a law-
suit without first attempting to utilize the collective bargaining con-
tract's grievance process. The Court stated that "as a general rule in
cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that
individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt
use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and
union as the mode of redress." ' The opinion in Moore v. Illinois Cen-
tral R. Co.,10 written by Justice Black and permitting a trainman to
bring a lawsuit for wrongful discharge before exhausting administrative
remedies granted by the Railway Labor Act, was initially distinguished
on the ground ". . . of permissive language in the Act-disputes 'may
be referred ... to the ... Adjustment Board. . ... "-
But the vital point is that in Maddox the Court, as it should have
done, acknowledged at the outset the union's inherent needs as a union,
and recognized the necessity of so doing in order to preserve the col-
lective bargaining process. Thus, while noting management's interest
in limiting the choice of remedies available to an aggrieved employee,
and the general adequacy of contract grievance procedures to protect
the individual employee's interest, the Court stated:
Union interest in prosecuting employer grievances is clear. Such ac-
tivity complements the union's status as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive by permitting it to participate actively in the continuing adminis-
tration of the contract. In addition, conscientious handling of grievance
claims will enhance the union's prestige with employees.' 2
It has, however, been asserted that the NLRB is a "poacher" on the
"arbitral domain," and that the exhaustion of contract remedies princi-
ple in Maddox should be extended ".... to the collective bargaining
representative and to the employer .... ." . Two given examples of so-
called "poaching" by the NLRB, when analyzed, reveal, to the con-
trary, that the Board is merely recognizing the union's legitimate in-
terest as a union, which is vital in order to maintain an effective col-
lective bargaining process.
0 Id. at 652.
10 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
11 379 U.S. at 654.
121d. at 653. But see the Court's remarks in note 24 infra.
13Cohen, NLRB: Poacher on the Arbitral Domain, 55 A.B.AJ. 437, 440 (1969).
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In W. P. lbrie & Sons, Division of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.,14 the col-
lective bargaining agreement contained a "union shop" 15 provision and
a "check-off" provision pursuant to which the employer deducted
union dues from the wages of those employees authorizing
such deduction, and remitted the dues to the union. The col-
lective bargaining contract's "union shop" clause was revoked by
the employees as the result of a deauthorization election,16 but none
of the employees attempted to resign from the union, nor did any
employee seek to revoke his dues check-off authorization. Management,
however, apparently seized upon what it believed to be a golden op-
portunity to rid itself of the union, and unilaterally refused to honor
the dues check-off provision. The employer advised the union that it
deemed the deauthorization vote a justification for its unilateral action,
and went even further in its attack upon the union by refunding to
the employees the union dues then being held by the employer.
Neither management nor union sought to invoke the contract's
grievance-arbitration procedure, and the union filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges against the employer because of the unilateral action taken
by management. It is difficult to comprehend, but under all of these
circumstances the NLRB's trial examiner somehow concluded in part
that the "entire matter involves something less than basic to the col-
lective bargaining relationship, and lends itself more properly to the
kind of particularized and individual adjustments which an arbitrator
is in a position to make, by applying his sound judgment and sense of
equity in interpreting the contract. . .. ," 17 The trial examiner recom-
mended that the union's complaint before the Board be dismissed, but
the Board ruled otherwise and held as follows:
The issue presented as a result of Respondent's conduct is the effect
under the (National Labor Relations) Act of an affirmative deauthoriza-
tion vote upon a contractual dues-check-off obligation of an employer;
it relates directly to the employer's statutory duty and is one which the
Board is specially competent to resolve. . . . In this case, the em-
ployer repudiated the check-off provision of its collective bargain-
ing contract with the Union, not only in its application to employees
14 [1967 CCH NLRB 21,432] 165 NLRB No. 2 [hereinafter cited as 165 NLRB
No. 2].
15 A union shop provision requires an applicant for employment to join the union
after he is hired, and usually requires him to maintain his membership thereafter.
16 29 U.S.C. S 159(e) (1964).
17 165 NLRB No. 2 at p. 27,940.
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who might not have wished to revoke their existing authorizations, but
in its application generally as a continuing contractual provision which
allowed new employees voluntarily to authorize this mode of paying
their dues. It follows, and we find, that the Respondent thereby uni-
laterally modified its contract with the Union in violation of Section 8
(a) (5) and (1) of the Act....18
Clearly, the employer's action in W. P. Ihrie was designed not
only to strip the union of its finances, but also to encourage its mem-
bers to resign (which they had not theretofore done). Such action by
management plainly constitutes unfair labor practice on its part, with
the objective of destroying the union and hence the collective bargain-
ing process. To insist that arbitration is appropriate in this situation,
rather than NLRB determination, is absurd. If it be argued by some
that federal policy dictates exhaustion of the grievance-arbitration pro-
cedure, it should also be borne in mind that in matters such as the one
presented in W. P. Ihrie, where the conduct complained of thrusts
at the very existence of the union as a union and thus threatens the
collective bargaining process, the NLRB is indeed "specially competent"
to make the appropriate determination. This is why Section 1G (a)
of the National Labor Relations Act,'9 empowering the Board to pre-
vent unfair labor practices, states in part that "this power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise.... I
So, too, the same rationale must apply to the facts presented in the
case of Producers Grain Corporation,20 where management discharged
an employee who had been instrumental in unionizing the employer's
operation. The discharged employee was also president of the local
union and a member of its grievance committee. The collective bar-
gaining contract contained a grievance-arbitration procedure, and dur-
ing the life of the contract the discharged employee was a prime mover
in the processing of other employees' grievances concerning their con-
ditions of employment. (In this connection, the Court's statement in
Republic Steel Corporation v. Maddox, that ".... conscientious handling
of grievance claims will enhance the union's prestige with employees
. .,,)21 is significant.) The discharged employee at one time had
18 Id. at p. 27,941.
19 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1964).
20 [1968 CCH NLRB 22,1031 169 NLRB No. 68 [hereinafter cited as 169 NLRB
No. 68].
21379 U.S. at 653.
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been told by the employer's superintendent that "you are going to
grieve yourself out of a job." The employer's sickness rule stated that
employees absent due to sickness had to furnish a doctor's certificate.
However, in the past management had not strictly enforced this rule,
but it seized upon the opportunity to strictly enforce it upon this key
employee and discharged him ostensibly because he returned to work
after a brief illness without a doctor's certificate. (He had in fact con-
sulted a physician and his wife had notified the employer of his illness.)
The discharged employee's grievance was processed through the con-
tract's grievance procedure, to no avail for him, when the union de-
cided to forego the arbitration procedure and filed on his behalf un-
fair labor practice charges against the employer.
The NLRB's trial examiner concluded that "the discharge was the
result of (management's) seizing upon the occasion of the employee's
illness and the reason given that the employee had failed to secure a
doctor's certificate was pretextual, violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act." 22 Nevertheless, the trial examiner then incomprehensibly recom-
mended that the NLRB hold its decision in abeyance pending binding
arbitration of the dispute. But the Board wisely ruled as follows:
In a situation such as this, where there has been no actual submission
to arbitration, where the unfair labor practice issue has already been
fully litigated and is before the NLRB for decision, and where the
case involves no issue which only an arbitrator would be competent
to determine, it would not effectuate the statutory policy to defer
this case for arbitration.
Again, it is submitted that in a case such as Producers Grain Corpo-
ration, where the employer's conduct constitutes a serious statutory
violation and penetrates the very heart of the collective bargaining
process, the union should be free to forego not only the arbitration
procedure, but the grievance procedure as well, if it so chooses. The
union should be free to seek the special competence of the Board
in matters of this kind, and Section 10 (a) 4 of the National Labor Re-
lations Act so provides the way.
22 169 NLRB No. 68 at p. 29,096.
23Id.
2429 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). The following statement of the United States Suprem
Court in Scofield is noteworthy in connection with 5 10 (a) and the Maddox, WJ
lbrie and Producers Grain decisions: "In both Skura and Marine Workers, the Boar
was concerned with union rules requiring a member to exhaust union remedies befo
filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. That rule, in the Board
Vol. 4:9:2
B. Enforcement of Union Rules and Regulations
Two United States Supreme Court cases, N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co.,25 and Scofield v. N.L.R.B.,26 demonstrate quite well that cer-
tain legitimate union interests are separate and distinct from basic indi-
vidual employee interests, and that these union interests must be upheld
if the national labor policy of encouraging the collective bargaining
process is to be effective. It is the effective maintenance of this national
policy vis-a-vis the individual employee's right to refrain from "con-
certed activities" that is under examination here.
In the more recent Scofield case, the union had a rule placing a ceil-
ing on the production for which union members could accept im-
mediate piecework pay. Wages due for production by union members
over the ceiling were to be "banked" or retained by the employer and
paid out to the employee for days on which the employee did not
reach the production ceiling. The employer had never agreed with the
union to refuse an employee, upon demand, immediate pay for work
done over the production ceiling, but the union, under its rule, would
assess such a recalcitrant member with a one dollar fine for each vio-
lation, and in cases of repeated violation the member would be fined
up to one hundred dollars for "conduct unbecoming a union mem-
ber." A "machine rate" of hourly pay was defined and guaranteed to
the employees by the collective bargaining contract. An industrious
employee could produce faster than the machine rate and thus earn
more, but if he were a union member, he would be subject to the
union rule's banking procedures. Both the employer and the union
bargained over the ceiling rate in the union's rule, and the union did
agree to increase the rate during bargaining sessions. The employer
cooperated with the union by making its work records available for
union inspection to check compliance by union members with the
view, frustrated the enforcement scheme established by the statute and the union
would commit an unfair labor practice by fining or expelling members who violated
the rule.
The Marine Workers case came here and the result reached by the Board was
sustained, the Court agreeing that the rule in question was contrary to the plain
policy of the Act to keep employees completely free from coercion against making
complaints to the Board. Frustrating this policy was beyond the legitimate interest
of the labor organization, at least where the member's complaint concerned conduct
of the employer as well as the union." Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423, 429-30
(1969).
25388 U.S. 175 (1967).
2G 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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union rule's ceiling rate, and the employer "banked" money for those
union members complying with the union's rule.
Some of the union's members, however, demanded immediate pay-
ment from the employer for production over the ceiling rate, and the
employer complied. Thereafter, these employees were suspended from
the union, by the union's membership, for one year and were fined
fifty to one hundred dollars. The recalcitrant union members refused
to pay the fines, so the union sued them in a state court to collect
the fines as a matter of contract law, and the fined members then filed
unfair labor practice charges against the union. They claimed that by
seeking to enforce its imposition of fines on them, the union was re-
straining or coercing them in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)27 by
impairing their Section 728 right to refrain from participation in "con-
certed activities." The Board's trial examiner found no unfair labor
practices, however, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's adop-
tion of his findings.
At the outset, the Court noted the absence of any evidence to show
that the union fines were unreasonable or arbitrarily imposed. Nor
was there any showing that the fined members' union membership was
involuntary. Further, the Court noted that the union rule in question
was enforced by the union through the acceptable, internal29 means of
union fines collected by threat of expulsion from the union or judicial
action. The Court thus reached the very heart of the matter, stating
that its "... inquiry must therefore focus on the legitimacy of the
union interest vindicated by the rule and the extent to which any
policy of the (National Labor Relations) Act may be violated by the
union-imposed production ceiling." 9a From this point on it was rela-
tively easy for the Court's rationale to flow as follows:
• . . [U]nion opposition to unlimited piecework pay systems is his-
toric. Union apprehension, not without foundation, is that such systems
will drive up employee productivity and in turn create pressures to
lower the piecework rate so that at the new, higher level of output
employees are earning little more than they did before .... The view
of the trial examiner was that "[i]n terms of a union's traditional
function'of trying to serve the economic interests of the group as a
2729 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964).
28 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
29That is, the union did not use the generally unacceptable external means of
.. . inducing the employer to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union's
rules." Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423, 429 (1969).
29a Id. at 431. See also the Court's remarks in Scofield, supra note 24.
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whole, the union has a very real, immediate, and direct interest in
it....
The Court observed ... that the union rule in question here affects
the interests of all three participants in the labor-management relation:
employer, employee, and union." 3' And, the Court also noted, "al-
though the enforcement of the rule is handled as an internal union
matter, the rule has and was intended to have an impact beyond the
confines of the union organization .... But... it does not follow from
this that the enforcement of the rule violates Section 8 (b) (1) (A),
unless some impairment of statutory labor policy can be shown." 32
Therefore, the Court reasoned, although "the principal contention of
the petitioner is that the (union) rule impedes collective bargaining,
a process nurtured in many ways by the Act..., we discern no basis
in the statutory policy encouraging collective bargaining for giving the
employer a better bargain than he has been able to strike at the bar-
gaining table." 3'
It was also concluded by the Court that the union rule in question
did not violate the collective bargaining contract, nor did those union
members who complied with it. Further, the Court held that the union
rule did not improperly discriminate between union and non-union
members in favor of non-members.
All members of the bargaining unit... have the same contractual rights.
In dealing with the employer as bargaining agent, the union has ac-
corded all employees uniform treatment. If members are prevented
from taking advantage of their contractual rights bargained for all em-
ployees it is because they have chosen to become and remain union
members. .... If a member chooses not to engage in this concerted
activity and is unable to prevail on the other members to change the
rule, then he may leave the union .... [T] he union has not induced
the employer to discriminate against the member but has merely for-
bidden the member to take advantage of benefits which the employer
stands willing to confer.3'
It is interesting to note that in Scofield Justice Black dissented for
the same reason he had previously done so in N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chal-
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mers Mfg. Co.3 5 In Scofield, however, he alone dissented (Justice Mar-
shall did not participate in the case), whereas in Allis-Chalmers he had
been joined in his dissent by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart.
Justice White, who wrote a concurring opinion in Allis-Cbahners, wrote
the majority opinion in Scofield. Because the Court in Scofield relied
almost exclusively on the rationale of its majority opinion in Allis-
Cbalners, two things in particular must be noted from that case. (Allis-
Cbalmers upheld the union's action in fining those of its members who
crossed a picket line during a valid economic strike called by the union.
Further, the Court upheld the union's right to secure payment of the
fines by suing its recalcitrant members in state court. The Court recog-
nized that "'... the power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if
the union is to be an effective bargaining agent. . ,,, 36) First, the
Court in Allis-Cbalmers specifically took cognizance of the regulation
of unions by and the "Bill of Rights" for union members under the
Landrum-Griffin Act, but secondly, found this legislation to be no
barrier to the following, exposition of national labor policy given by
the Court:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling
their economic strength and acting through a labor organization
freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in
wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extin-
guishes the individual employee's power to order his own relations
with his employer and creates a power vested in the chosen repre-
sentative to act in the interests of all employees. "Congress has seen
fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable
to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict
the rights of those whom it represents. . . ." Steele v. L. & N. R. Co.,
323 U.S. 192, 202. Thus, only the union may contract the employee's
terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for processing
his grievances; the union may even bargain away his right to strike
during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful
picket line. The employee may disagree with many of the union
decisions but is bound by them. "The majority-rule concept is today
unquestionably at the center of our federal labor policy." 37 "The com-
plete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.
35 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
36 Id. at 181.
VI But see the United States Supreme Court's remarks in Brooks v. N.L.R.B., infra
note 57.
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A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargain-
ing representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338.88
C. Authorization Cards
The general rule is that when the union demands recognition solely'.
-on the basis of authorization cards signed by a majority of the em-:
ployees, management may properly refuse to recognize the union as:
the employees' exclusive bargaining representative if there is a good.
faith doubt on management's part that the union in fact has been choser
by the employees to be their collective bargaining agent.3 9 What consti-
tutes a good faith doubt depends upon the circumstances of each case,
but if the employer refuses recognition in bad faith, the NLRB may.
find that he is wrongfully refusing to bargain with the union in vio-
lation of Section 8 (a) (5), and may order him to bargain with the
union in good faith, even in the situation where a representation elec-.
tion has been held and the union has lost.40
Most federal courts of appeal have upheld and enforced such NLRB
bargaining orders, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has apparently taken a position blatantly in conflict with that of:
the NLRB and most other circuits. As this article is being written, the
Fourth Circuit's minority position,4' along with the majority view as,
represented by the First Circuit,42 is being considered by the United'
States Supreme Court.4 3 It is submitted that unless the Supreme Court
sidesteps the broad issue raised by the Fourth Circuit, and instead de-'
cides the cases before it on narrower grounds, the majority view should
be affirmed and the Fourth Circuit's view rejected because it conflicts
with the national labor policy of encouraging the collective bargain-
ing process. The cases before the Supreme Court at this writing (Sin-
clair and Gissel) constitute the subject of discussion here.
In N.L.R.B. v. Sinclair Co.,44 the union gave notice to the employer
38 388 U.S. at 180.
39 See, e.g., Snow, d.b.a. Snow & Sons v. N.L.R.B., 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962);.
Joy Silk Mills v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
40 Joy Silk Mills v. N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
41N..R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc. and Food Store Employees Union, Local'
347, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-
CIO, Intervenor, 398 F.2d 336 (4th Ci. 1968).
42 N.L.R.B. v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). -
43 N.L.R.B.v. Gissel, cert. granted and cases consolidated, 395 U.S. 575 (1969). V"
44 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
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that it represented a majority of the employees and requested manage-
ment to bargain with it. The union offered to submit signed authoriza-
tion cards for authentication of the union's claimed status of bargain-
ing representative, but the employer simply refused to recognize the
union. The union then filed a representation petition with the NLRB;
both management and union stipulated to a Board conducted election
among the employees involved; the election was held and the union lost
by one vote. The union then filed unfair labor practice charges against
management and petitioned to have the Board set aside the election. The
Board did so and entered an unfair labor practice bargaining order
against the employer, and petitioned the United States Court of Ap-
peals, First Circuit, for enforcement of its bargaining order.
The court affirmed the NLRB's bargaining order, stating that the
employer had committed pre-election unfair labor practices as the
Board had found, and that "substantial evidence" 45 had been presented
to the Board to support its finding that "instead of recognizing the
union on the basis of its admitted card majority the company insisted
on an election . . . in order to gain time in which to dissipate the
union's majority." 46 Accordingly, the court ruled, "in view of the
company's unlawful interference with the employees' rights during
the pre-election campaign, we think the Board acted within its dis-
cretion in setting aside the election and in ordering the company to
bargain." 47 The court specifically rejected the employer's contention
that authorization cards are not reliable in ascertaining the union's ma-
jority status, saying:
Actually what the company is contending here is that signed au-
thorization cards are so unreliable that it has a right to reject a re-
quest for recognition based on them and insist upon an election.
We have already rejected this proposition in this circuit....
In the instant case there is undisputed evidence of the union's majority
status long prior to the election. It is reasonable to conclude that this
status was dissipated by the company's unlawful interference with
the employees' Section 7 rights, thus tainting the . . . election. In
these circumstances we think the Board was warranted in entering
a bargaining order rather than ordering a new election.48
4529 U.S.C. §160(e) (1964). Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NL.R.B., 340 U.S. 474
(1951).




Contrast the foregoing rationale of the First Circuit with that of the
Fourth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 9 where the
court, after finding that there was "substantial evidence" to support the
Board's finding that management had engaged in serious, unlawful pre-
election conduct, coercing the employees and otherwise violating their
rights, nevertheless stated that the employer had not unlawfully refusect
to bargain with the union on the basis of signed authorization cards:
obtained by the union from employees because:
In recent cases we have had occasion to point out that authorizationt
cards are such unreliable indicators of the desires of the employees.
that an employer confronted with a demand for recognition based!
solely upon them is justified in withholding recognition pending the
result of a certification election.50
Actually, the ground upon which the Fourth Circuit appears to tread
in such confidence is really not so steady. Witness, for example, the
court's remark in N.L.R.B. v. Heck's, Inc.,51 that "this is not one of
those extraordinary cases in which a bargaining order might be an
appropriate remedy for pervasive violations of Section 8 (a) (1)." So,
too, this very same court in N.L.R.B. v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., Inc.5 2
upheld the Board's bargaining order on the basis of authorization cards
obtained by the union because "when the employer has conducted his
own investigation, the results of which confirm the union's claim, we
think it reliably establishes the union's majority and the employer's
lack of any good faith doubt of it." And again, this same United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in N.L.R.B. v. S. S. Logan
Packing Co., 3 admits:
It has always been true, too, that the duty to bargain is not de-
pendent upon a Board certification under Section 9 (c). An employer
believing an independent union represents a majority, may recognize
it.... The duty to bargain follows from recognition. Without recog-
nition, it arises if recognition is wrongfully withheld when the union
clearly represents a majority of the employees and the employer has
no doubt of it, and in such a case there is no question of representa-
tion for the Board to resolve (by conducting an election). The duty
49 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968).
o Id. at 337.
51398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
52 386 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967).
53 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967).
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to extend recognition and to bargain when there is no question con-
cerning representation is settled under the (National Labor Relations)
Act in its present form as it was under the original Wagner Act.54
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court years ago acknowledged:
Section 8 (a) (5) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a). .. .
Section 9 (a), which deals expressly with employee representation,
says nothing as to how the employees' representative shall be chosen.
...It does not make it a condition that the representative . . . shall
be certified by the Board, or even be eligible for such certification."5
The Fourth Circuit's blatant assertion in Gissel that authorization
cards are so unreliable as to ipso facto justify an employer's with-
'holding recognition when the union's demand for such is based solely
,on them, is thus contradicted not only by prior United States Supreme
Court decisions, but also by other decisions in the Fourth Circuit, as well
as by the plain language of the National Labor Relations Act. The
difficulty that the Fourth Circuit seems to be having, it is submitted,
stems from its failure in this area to appreciate the overall national
labor policy of encouraging the collective bargaining process. Not-
withstanding precedent and clear statutory language, the Fourth Circuit
has, in effect, taken the position in Gissel that employees are too in-
competent to intelligently designate, via signed authorization cards, a
union as their collective bargaining agent, and that unions will not
,obtain such cards in a fair manner. But the court noticeably does not
"judicially notice" that management rarely wishes to recognize a union,
"good faith doubt" or not, and that management almost always wel-
comes an opportunity to dissipate the union's validly attained majority
status by insisting that an election first be held.
The Fourth Circuit's rationale in Gissel simply refuses to acknowl-
edge the employees' Section 7 right to organize themselves without
first voting in a formal election. It simply refuses to recognize that this
is the way unions function, the way they organize. It is a very basic,
democratic way of organizing, and acknowledges the individual em-
ployee's competency to sign or refuse to sign an authorization card.
If the union abuses its right to attempt to organize the employees, such
54 Id. at 569.
-5 Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71 (1956).
[Vol. 4:92
as by misrepresentation or coercion, then the NLRB -is specially
equipped to remedy the situation.56 So, too, if management's motives
in refusing to recognize the union are unlawful, and the Board so finds
on the basis of substantial evidence presented to it, then the courts
have a duty to recognize the Board's expertise in labor relations and
hence to enforce its remedial orders, including bargaining orders.57 Cer-
tainly Judge Sobeloff's conclusion in his concurring opinion in N.L.R.B.
v. Sehon Stevenson & Co., Inc.,"" is the sensible approach with respect
to authorization cards:
Their validity may not be judged without investigation into the par-
ticular card employed and the overall atmosphere in which signatures
were procured. When textually unambiguous and secured without
fraud or coercion, cards may be a reliable indicator of employees'
union desires. More importantly, where employer unfair labor prac-
tices have destroyed the possibility of a valid election, a card majority
is the only reliable guide to the wishes of the employees. 9
tic 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). See, e.g., Englewood Lumber Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961).
Walker Process Equipment, Inc., [1967 CCH NLRB 21,218] 163 NLRB No. 78.
5729 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). During its discussion of matters ". . . appropriately de-
termned by the Board's administrative authority," the Court stated. "... . [Wie (have)
held that where a union's majority was dissipated after an employer's unfair labor
practice in refusing to bargain, the Board could appropriately find that such conduct
had undermined the prestige of the union and require the employer to bargain with
it for a reasonable period despite the loss of majority. . . . (and) we (have) held
that a claim of an intervening loss of majority was no defense to a proceeding for
enforcement of an order to cease and desist from certain unfair labor practices."
Brooks v. N.L.R.B., 348 U.S. 96, 102 (1954).
5 8386 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967).
0 Judge Sobeloff's cogent concurring opinion further observes that "the fact is
thar the only statistical study of cards, upon which the (Fourth Circuit majority in)
the Logan opinion relies heavily, concludes: '[A]uthorization cards do have validity.'
id. at 554-55. And noting Professor Pollitt's study of NLRB re-run elections, Judge
Sobeloff points out: "Premising his observation on 20,153 elections held between
1960 and 1962. [sic] Pollitt concludes that in over two-thirds of the cases, the party
who destroyed the election process in the first instance wins in the re-run." Id.
at 556. Hence, we have the Board's wisdom in issuing an 8(a) (5) bargaining order
rather than conducting a re-run election. Finally, Judge Sobeloff states: "'Crocodile
tears' shed by an employer over the loss of his employees' free and untrammelled
choice after he has violated either section 8(a) (1) or (3) or both should not im-
press us. Nor do I share my brethren's concern that the employees may end up being
represented by a minority union. In the first place, this is not a statistical probability
as evidenced by the figures cited in Logan. Secondly, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that there are other values-such as the need to deter employer unfair prac-
tices-in our labor policy which may on occasion override the desideratum of
majority representation (citing cases). Finally, a minority union facing a hostile em-
ployer can cause the employees little harm while having strong incentive to do them
much good" (citing Professor Bok). Id. at 557.
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The United States Supreme Court should reaffirm the reasoning in
Judge Sobeloff's opinion.*
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to show that the stated policy
of the United States to encourage the procedure of collective bargain-
ing is not a mere remark prefatory in nature, having little substance.
Quite to the contrary, it is a pithy statement of national labor policy
demanding a keen insight into the basic, inner workings of organized
labor relations. Whenever those who have the awesome duty to uphold
this policy lack the requisite insight, or fail to appreciate the inherent
nature and basic need of the union as a union, then the maintenance
of the national policy is threatened, and our security in an effective
collective bargaining process is impaired.
0 Editor's Note.
After this article was submitted and about to go to press, the United States Su-
preme Court's decision concerning the validity and effect of authorization cards
came down. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Court, speak-
ing through Chief Justice Warren, unanimously held in pertinent part that (1) the
duty to bargain can arise without a Board election under the National Labor Relations
Act; (2) union authorization cards, if obtained from a majority of employees with-
out representation or coercion, are reliable enough generally to provide a valid,
alternate route to majority status; and (3) an NLRB bargaining order is an ap-
propriate and authorized remedy where an employer rejects a card majority while
at the same time committing unfair labor practices that tend to undermine the union's
majority and make a fair election an unlikely possibility. It is noteworthy that the
Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to the
extent that the Fourth Circuit "decline (d) enforcement of the Board's orders to bar-
gain," and affirmed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, as advocated by Mr. Levit in his article. id. at 620. As Mr. Levit suggested
might occur, the Court seemingly did sidestep the broad issue raised by the Fourth
Circuit, stating that "because the employers' refusal to bargain in each of these cases
was accompanied in each instance by independent unfair labor practices which tend
to preclude the holding of a fair election, we need not decide whether a bargaining
order is ever appropriate in cases where there is no interference with the election
processes." Id. at 595.
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